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En este artículo estudiamos política tributaria óptima en un contexto donde las empresas 
difieren en productividad y deciden si producir después de comparar las ganancias que 
obtendrían después de impuestos versus una opción externa. Estudiamos un contexto donde el 
gobierno cobra impuestos al capital, a las ganancias de las empresas y al trabajo, pero no cobra 
impuestos a la opción externa. En este contexto, los impuestos pueden distorsionar la decisión 
de las firmas de entrar en el sector formal (margen extensivo) como así también sus decisiones 
de contratación de factores de producción una vez que decidieron producir (margen intensivo). 
Encontramos que el gobierno tiene incentivos a subsidiar costos para inducir a las empresas a 
producir. El impuesto óptimo a los ingresos derivados del capital es negativo, mientras que la 







We study steady state optimal taxation in a context where firms differ in productivity and they 
decide whether to produce or not after comparing after-tax profits vis-à-vis an outside 
alternative option. The government taxes capital income, firms’ profits and labor income, but 
does not tax the alternative outside option. In this context, taxation might distort the firms’ 
decisions to participate in production (extensive margin) as well as their factor allocations once 
they decide to produce (intensive margin). We find that the government has incentives to 
subsidize costs to induce firms into production. The optimal capital income tax is negative while 
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In this paper we study steady state optimal (Ramsey) taxation in a context where ﬁrms
are heterogeneous in the sense that they differ in their productivity and decide whether
to enter into production or not. This decision is taken after comparing the after-tax prof-
its obtained from production vis-µ a-vis an outside alternative option. The government
ﬁnances an exogenous expenditure path using three tax instruments: capital income tax,
labor income tax and a tax on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Also, the government can issue debt to ﬁ-
nance its expenditure but, crucially, we assume that the yields of the alternative option
cannot be taxed.
In this context, taxation potentially distorts the ﬁrms’ decision to participate in pro-
duction, i.e. the extensive margin distortion, as well as the factor allocations of the ﬁrms
already involved in production, i.e. the intensive margin distortion.
The distortions created in the extensive margin are key to our results. When there are
ﬁrms that choose not to produce, it is optimal to set a negative tax on capital income and a
positive tax on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. There is also a tendency to subsidize labor, although the sign
of this tax depends on labor supply considerations. The intuition is that by subsidizing
capital income, and possibly labor, the planner induces more ﬁrms into production and
makes them taxable through the tax on proﬁts.
However, when there is no distortion in the extensive margin, i.e. when all ﬁrms
decide to produce or when the government can also tax the alternative option, the optimal
capital income tax is equal to zero, as in the celebrated results of Chamley (1986) and Judd
(1985). The tax on labor is also zero in this case and all tax revenues are raised using the
tax on proﬁts. The intuition is that, in this case, additional capital and labor is not socially
desirable since they do not enlarge the taxable set of ﬁrms and thus it is optimal not to
distort the intensive margins. The tax on proﬁts does not distort any margin.
Our main analysis is conducted as if the government cannot tax the alternative option.
However, wealsoanalyzethecasewhereitispossibletotaxthealternativeoptiontoshow
the importance of the distortions on the extensive margin in the results.
The paper is related to several other studies in the literature. Chamley (1986) and
Judd (1985) ﬁnd that the optimal capital income taxation is equal to zero in steady state in
a competitive environment. Following these studies, several papers showed that optimal
capital income taxation is different from zero if the context is modiﬁed in some ways.
Correia (1996) extends Chamley (1986)’s result to an environment of incomplete taxa-
1tion, where not all factors can be taxed. She ﬁnds that taxing capital would be an indirect
way of taxing the untaxed factor and the sign of this tax would depend on the comple-
mentarity between capital and the untaxed factor.1 Like Correia (1996), we consider a
context of incomplete taxation where the government does not tax the alternative option,
but differ in that we analyze an environment where ﬁrms are heterogeneous. Firm het-
erogeneity and the distortions created in the extensive margin are key to our results. In
this setting, the planner has incentives to subsidize costs in order to tax ﬁrms that would
not otherwise be taxed. Thus, the optimal capital income taxation is negative.
In the same vein as Correia (1996), other studies ﬁnd that capital taxes should not
be zero as a consequence of incomplete taxation. Jones et al (1993) study the issue with
endogenous growth models, showing that including government expenditures as a pro-
ductive input leads to an optimal tax rate different from zero. The reason is similar to
Correia’s explanation since government expenditure is not taxed. Jones et al (1997) also
show that the zero income capital tax is no longer optimal when pure proﬁts are gener-
ated. Their interpretation of this result is that taxing capital is a way of taxing pure proﬁts
in a setting where they cannot be taxed directly.
A second line of research related to our study includes Judd (1997), Judd (2002) and
Coto-Martinez et al (2007). Judd (1997) and Judd (2002) argue that the optimal capital
income tax rate is negative and the tax on proﬁts is positive in a context of monopolistic
competition. Coto-Martinez et al (2007) add entry and exit of ﬁrms to Judd’s framework,
where the entrance of new ﬁrms augment the general productivity of the economy but
implies a waste of resources in the form of a ﬁxed cost. In Coto-Martinez et al (2007)
optimal taxes depend on the tax code available. When the available taxes are such that
the government can control the number of ﬁrms through a tax on proﬁts, it is optimal
to subsidize capital to correct the markup distortion as in Judd and set a subsidy or a
tax on proﬁts depending on the aggregate returns to specialization. When the tax system
does not allow to control the number of ﬁrms through proﬁts taxation, they ﬁnd that the
optimal capital income taxation is zero if the returns to specialization are zero. The reason
is that, in this case, it is not desirable to subsidize the entrance of new ﬁrms since there are
only losses (ﬁxed cost) associated with them.
We also ﬁnd that it is optimal to subsidize capital but in a different context and for
different reasons. Ours is a context of perfect competition (no markup distortions) and
1Correia (1996) suggests that similar results would be obtained if ﬁrms present decreasing returns to scale
and proﬁts cannot be taxed.
2without aggregate returns to specialization. In the general case, where the yields of the
alternative option cannot be taxed, it is optimal to subsidize capital, and possibly labor,
to induce ﬁrms that are on the margin into production, making their taxation possible.
As mentioned above, if the alternative option could be taxed at the same rate as proﬁts
the labor and capital taxes are zero. Thus, in our case, the planner provides a subsidy to
capital in order to complete the tax system and not due to distortions created by imperfect
competition or the presence of returns to specialization.
While, to the best of our knowledge, the papers most related to ours are those men-
tioned above, there are other papers that ﬁnd an optimal capital income tax different from
zero. Aiyagari (1995) makes the point in an economy with borrowing constraints, where
precautionary savings leads to too much capital in steady state. The optimality of tax-
ing capital income was also obtained in OLG models. Recent work using this approach
includes Abel (2005) and Erosa and Gervais (2002). Abel (2005) focuses on a context of
consumption externalities between generations and shows that taxing capital is a way to
correcttheno“internalization”ofcohorts’consumption. ErosaandGervais(2002)derives
the optimality of capital taxation as a way of making taxes age-dependant. In a context
of private information about agents’ skills, Golosov et al (2003) show that it is optimal
to have a wedge between the marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost of investing, which is
consistent with a positive tax on capital income.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
sets up the Ramsey problem; subsection 3.1 analyzes capital income taxation, subsection
3.2 sets the optimal labor income and proﬁts tax and subsection 3.3 studies the case when
the yields of the alternative option is taxable. Section 4 presents numerical examples that
conﬁrm our theoretical ﬁndings and provides quantitative impacts in the case of standard
utility and production functions. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Firms
There is a set I of mass one of heterogeneous ﬁrms indexed by i that can operate and
produce a single good. Firm heterogeneity comes from a productivity parameter, Ait,
which is iid across time t and is distributed across ﬁrms with cumulative distribution
G(Ait) with support [Al;Au], where 0 < Al < Au < 1. Let kit and lit be capital and labor
3used by ﬁrm i in the production process in period t.
Capital is rented from the representative household each period at the rental rate rt,
which, in equilibrium, is the same for all ﬁrms. Firms pay an amount wt as compensation
for the use of labor, which is also common to all ﬁrms in equilibrium. Both, rt and wt
are expressed in terms of the consumption good. Each ﬁrm production function presents
decreasing returns to scale and is given by Aitf(kit;lit), where f(kit;lit) is strictly increas-
ing, strictly concave and satisﬁes Inada conditions on kit and lit. We further assume that
f(kit;lit) is homogeneous of degreeµ < 1 in (kit;lit). This last assumption is not important
to the main results of the paper but simpliﬁes the exposition.
Let Á > 0 be an outside option, common to all ﬁrms, expressed in units of the single
good that each ﬁrm would get in an alternative project not considered explicitly in the
paper.
In each period, ﬁrm i must decide between entering the market to produce, or not en-
tering. To make this decision, ﬁrms compare the after-tax proﬁts derived from production
and the yields of the alternative option. We make the following assumption about the
taxes that a ﬁrm faces:
Assumption 1. The government taxes ﬁrms’ proﬁts at a rate ¿u
t but cannot tax the parameter Á.
This assumption implies that the tax system is incomplete and it is very important to
our results as will become clear below. We analyze the consequences of dropping it in
section 3.3.
The outside option could be interpreted in the same spirit as in Jovanovic (1982) who
considers it as a “managerial ability” or “advantageous location” which is common to all
ﬁrms. Note, however, that an implication of Assumption 1 is that we could also interpret
Á as the return obtained by the ﬁrms in an informal sector where returns cannot be taxed
by the government.
This last interpretation of Á deserves more discussion. It is common in the literature to
model the informal sector as using labor more intensively than capital. See, for example,
Turnovsky and Basher (2009), Ihrig and Moe (2004), Larrain and Poblete (2007) and Yuki
(2007), where the informal sector is modeled using only labor while the formal sector uses
both capital and labor. We model the outside option as not using any factor of production
and yielding a ﬁxed and common value Á. However, the trade offs analyzed in this paper
and its results are robust to modeling the alternative activity as using a labor intensive
4production function as is done in the works mentioned above.2
Firms’ proﬁts derived from production are given by the product obtained minus pay-
ments to capital and labor. The rental rate of capital and the wage rate are determined in
competitive markets and are the same for all ﬁrms. Thus, ﬁrms deciding to produce must
obtain after-tax proﬁts that are at least equal to Á. Hence, a ﬁrm solves the following static
problem in period t:
maxfÁ ; Vitg (1)
where Vit = max
kit;lit
(1 ¡ ¿u
t )[Aitf(kit;lit) ¡ rtkit ¡ wtlit] = max
kit;lit
(1 ¡ ¿u
t )(1 ¡ µ)Aitf(kit;lit);
the last term holds because of the homogeneity of the production function.
Let Vlt and Vut be the function Vit evaluated at the lowest and highest productivity
shocks, Ait = Al and Ait = Au, respectively.
Assumption 2. Vut > Á:
This assumption assures entrance of a positive mass of ﬁrms into production. The
solution to the ﬁrm’s problem, given in equation (1), is stated in the next lemma.
Lemma 1. There exists a threshold technology level A¤ such that ﬁrms endowed with technology
Ait ¸ A¤
t enter into production, while ﬁrms endowed with Ait < A¤
t do not enter into production.
When Vlt · Á, the threshold A¤




t )(1 ¡ µ)A¤
tf(kit;lit) = Á: (2)
When Vlt > Á, the threshold A¤
t is equal to Al.
Proof. The function Vit in (1) is an increasing and continuous function of Ait.3 Then,
when Vlt is smaller than Á, there is a unique Ait that makes Vit equal to Á given our
assumption that Vut is always higher than Á. If Vlt were larger than Á, all ﬁrms would
prefer to produce and the threshold A¤
t will be given by Al. 2
2For the sake of brevity we do not report this development in the paper. However, it is available from the
authors upon request.
3By the envelope theorem
@Vit
@Ait = (1 ¡ ¿
u
t )f(kit;lit).
5Firms demand capital and labor if they participate in production, however these fac-
tors are not needed if the ﬁrm is not engaged in production and participate in the alter-
native option. Thus, factor demands are functions of factor prices and the idiosyncratic
shock and are generically given by:
kit = kit(Ait;rt;wt) if A¤
t · Ait;
kit = 0 if A¤
t > Ait (3)
and
lit = lit(Ait;rt;wt) if A¤
t · Ait
lit = 0 if A¤
t > Ait: (4)
Markets are competitive, capital and labor are paid their marginal productivity, and
the rental rate and wage rate are the same for all ﬁrms. Hence, the rental and wage rates
















where 1 ¡ G(A¤
t) is the fraction of ﬁrms involved in production in period t.
The capital and labor demands for the economy follow from the aggregation of indi-
vidual factor demands by all the ﬁrms that decide to produce; that is, all the ﬁrms that get















4Each ﬁrm equates its marginal productivity of capital and labor to the interest rate and the wage rate
respectively, that is, rt = Aitfk(kit;lit) and wt = Aitfl(kit;lit) . Equations (5) and (6) follow by aggregation
of these expressions among all ﬁrms that decide to produce.
62.2 The household
There is an inﬁnitely lived representative household choosing a consumption path fctg1
t=0





where u(.) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and three times continuously differ-
entiable in both arguments. We assume also that uch ¸ 0. The household is endowed at
time zero with an initial amount of capital K0 and holds the initial stock of government
bonds b0. Each period, she decides how much to consume, how much to work, how much
to invest in capital and government bonds to be held into next period. It is assumed that
capital depreciates at rate ± while total time available to work and to rest is H. Capital,
Kt, is rented to ﬁrms in order to be used in the production process at the rental rate rt.
Labor, Lt, is also rented to ﬁrms at the rate wt. The representative individual receives
the after-tax proﬁts that ﬁrms obtain in the production process,
R Au
A¤
t VitdG(Ait), or alter-
natively, the returns of the outside option if ﬁrms do not engage in production, ÁG(A¤
t) .
The government taxes the rental rate at rate ¿k
t , the wage rate at the rate ¿l
t, ﬁrms’ proﬁts
at rate ¿u
t and issues one-period bonds, which pay a gross interest rate of Rt. Let bd
t be the
stock of bonds held by the representative household. Hence, each period the household
faces the following budget constraint:











Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + it (11)
ht + Lt = H (12)
where following Chamley (1986) we deﬁne the variables ~ rt and ~ wt as ~ rt ´ rt(1 ¡ ¿k
t )
and ~ wt ´ wt(1 ¡ ¿l
t).
Note that the household’s problem does not include explicit expressions concerning
uncertainty. In fact, uncertainty in our model arises in the ﬁrm sector. While each ﬁrm
faces an idiosyncratic shock, there is no aggregate uncertainty in this economy as the
productivity parameter has the same distribution in each period.
7The solution to the consumer’s problem yields the standard optimality conditions
which include the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consump-
tion (13), the intratemporal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption (14), the
non-arbitrage condition (15) and the transversality conditions for capital and government
bonds.
Uc(t) = ¯Uc(t + 1)(1 + e rt+1 ¡ ±) (13)
Uh(t) = Uc(t)e wt (14)
Rt = 1 + e rt+1 ¡ ± (15)
2.3 The government
As is usual in the optimal taxation literature the government collects taxes to ﬁnance an
exogenous expenditure path fgtg1
t=0. We assume that government expenditure is waste-
ful; that is, it does not provide any utility to the consumer. As noted above, the govern-
ment ﬁnances its expenditure by issuing bonds and levying ﬂat-rate, time-varying taxes
on capital income, on labor income and on ﬁrms’ proﬁts. To avoid the possibility that the
governmentraisesallrevenuesbytaxinginitialcapitalheavilynotdistortingtheeconomy
allocations, we make the standard assumption that the government takes the tax rate on
capital income in the ﬁrst period, ¿k
0, as given. We also assume that the government can
commit itself to a given policy so we do not analyze commitment issues. Further,
Assumption 3. We assume that ¿u < 1.
We consider the case where ¿u < 1 because when ¿u = 1 there would be no ﬁrms
producing, making it impossible to collect revenues to ﬁnance ﬁscal expenditure.5





















t ¸ gt 8t
The ﬁrst term on the left hand side is the amount of taxes on labor income, the sec-
ond is the amount raised from capital income while the third term corresponds to the
5In fact, when ¿
u = 1 we have Vit = 0 < Á; 8i
8taxes raised from ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Since the ﬁrms’ production functions are homogeneous
of degree µ and using the deﬁnitions of (e wt;e rt), the government’s budget constraint can
be written as (see appendix):
¿u






















kitdG(Ait) ¸ gt 8t (16)
2.4 Equilibrium
Given the description of our economy, we may state the following deﬁnition of equilib-
rium.











1. the household maximizes (9) subject to (10), (11) and (12) taking K0 and b0 as given,
2. each ﬁrm solves (1) conditional on Ait,
3. the sequence of threshold technology levels is determined by:
(1 ¡ ¿u
t )(1 ¡ µ)A¤
tf(k¤
t;l¤
t) ¸ Á 8t;
where k¤
t;l¤
t are the optimal capital stock and labor demanded by the ﬁrm endowed with the
threshold technology level,
4. the government satisﬁes (16),






96. the labor market clears, i.e.









8. the goods market clears






t) + (1 ¡ ±)Kt 8t (20)
3 The Ramsey Problem and the Optimal Taxes
Our goal is to characterize the tax rates that are consistent with the allocations in a second
best steady state, assuming that the economy converges to this steady state in the long
run. As is standard in the literature, the social planner will choose among the set of com-
petitive equilibria available the one that maximizes the representative individual utility.
The planner chooses the allocations, tax rates and threshold technology subject to goods
market clearing, consumer budget constraints, government budget constraints and the



























































1 + ~ rt+1 ¡ ±




t [uc(t) ¡ ¯uc(t + 1)(1 + ~ rt+1 ¡ ±)] + ¸4
t [uh(t) ¡ uc(t) ~ wt] + ¸5
t [(1 ¡ ¿u






Note that the above Ramsey problem is written as in the “dual approach”, similar
to many papers in the literature. In stating the problem, we follow Chamley (1986) by
including ~ rt and ~ wt. Note that these expressions do not represent prices but replace the
capital income tax and the labor income tax, respectively.
The ﬁrst constraint in this problem is the goods market clearing, given by equation
(20). The second is the government budget constraint (16) taking into account the non-
arbitrage condition (15), while the third is the intertemporal consumption Euler equation
(13). The fourth restriction is the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure (14). The last restriction indicates that the marginal ﬁrm (i.e. the
least productive ﬁrm that decides to operate) must earn after-tax proﬁts at least as large
as the outside option in the alternative activity.6 For expositional simplicity we include
the optimal conditions of the Ramsey problem in the appendix.
3.1 Optimal capital income taxation
We will next state the planner’s optimal condition concerning the ith ﬁrm’s capital stock,
kit. The optimality condition evaluated in steady state is:7
6We do not post the consumer budget constraint because it is redundant by Walras law.
7Follows from equation (53) in the appendix, dividing both sides by ¯
t and taking out time indexes (since
we analyze steady state).
11¸1
·




g(Ai) + ¸2 [¿u(1 ¡ µ)Aifk(ki;li) + µAifk(ki;li) ¡ e r]g(Ai)
+ ¸5(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)A¤fk(k¤;l¤)1[Ai = A¤] = 0; (22)
where 1[Ai = A¤] equals to one if ﬁrm i is the marginal ﬁrm and is zero otherwise.
The ﬁrst term of this optimality condition indicates the marginal social value of the
increaseinoutputderivedfromthemarginalincreaseincapitalbyﬁrminetofinvestment
cost, while the second term is the social valuation of the increase in tax revenues derived
from the increase in capital. The last term indicates the social value of an additional unit of
capitalinvestedbythemarginalﬁrm, whichrelaxestheparticipationconstraint, enlarging
the set of ﬁrms that are involved in production and, thus, are taxable.
The last term involving ¸5 refers to the distortion in the extensive margin and is key
to our results. The ﬁrst two terms related to ¸1 and ¸2 appear also in previous analysis
where the optimal capital tax is equal to zero (e.g. Chamley 1985). The valuation given
to the investment made by the marginal ﬁrm provides an additional beneﬁt derived from
an additional unit of capital.





Ai(1 ¡ µ)f(ki;li)dG(Ai) = ¸5A¤(1 ¡ µ)f(k¤;l¤): (23)
This expression also highlights the extensive margin distortion produced by a change
in ¿u. It balances the marginal social cost of raising ¿u, given by the social value of dis-
placing the marginal ﬁrm out of production, the term on the right hand side containing
¸5, with the social value of raising government revenues trough the increase in this tax
rate.
Integrating (22) over all the ﬁrms involved in production and using (23) , we obtain
the following expression for ¿k (see appendix):
¿k =
·















ﬁrm in total production (proﬁts). Note that SY is positive but less than one since the
marginal ﬁrm has lower production (proﬁts) than the rest of the ﬁrms involved in pro-
duction.
Equation (24) is not a reduced form expression for ¿k. In fact, it depends on other
endogenous variables such as A¤; ¸5
¸1+¸2 and SY . However, it allows us to obtain some
intuition about the sign of ¿k. Firstly, note that ¿k · 0. This result holds because (1)
¿u < 1 if not, no ﬁrm would be involved in production, (2) ¸1;¸2 and ¸5 are non negative
and (3) SY < 1.
Note the relevance of the extensive margin distortion in our results. If ¸5 were equal
to zero the optimal capital income tax would be zero as in the classical results of Chamley
(1986) and Judd (1985). In this case, all ﬁrms are involved in production and there is no
distortion in the extensive margin.8
However, if there are ﬁrms not involved in production, such that ¸5 is positive, it is
optimal to subsidize capital income. This incentive to subsidize capital income comes
from the extra social beneﬁt derived from the additional unit of capital employed by the
marginal ﬁrm (the term related to ¸5 in (22) discussed above). By setting ¿k less than zero
the steady state rental rate faced by ﬁrms, r, is depressed.9 This provides incentives to
ﬁrms that are not producing, but that are in the neighborhood of doing so, to enter into
production and allows the government to obtain revenue from them through the tax on
proﬁts. This would be the case if ¿u > 0, a result that will be shown below.
As will be shown below, it is key to our results that the yields from the alternative
option cannot be taxed at the same rate as proﬁts. In our case, the government cannot
obtain ﬁscal revenues from ﬁrms not involved in production. By inducing some ﬁrms
into production through a decrease in the interest rate, the planner enlarges the set of
ﬁrms that can be taxed using a tax on proﬁts. The planner completes the tax system, at
least partially.
Note that when there is no heterogeneity between ﬁrms, i.e. SY = 1, the optimal
capital tax rate is zero. However, this situation is considered in the above discussion since
8If all ﬁrms are involved in production ¸5 is equal to zero by complementary slackness.
9By the consumer’s Euler condition, equation (13), in a steady state, we have:
1 = ¯(1 + r(1 ¡ ¿
k) ¡ ±):
13in this case all ﬁrms would be producing; if all ﬁrms were in the alternative option there
would not be taxation and the analysis loses relevance.
We can summarize the ﬁndings of this section in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. It is optimal to set ¿k less than zero if and only if not all ﬁrms are producing. In
the case that all ﬁrms are involved in production, the optimal ¿k is zero.
Proof. See the discussion above.
3.2 Optimal labor tax and optimal tax on proﬁts
In this section, we focus on the planner’s choice of the tax rate on labor and proﬁts. As
in the case of the expression concerning ¿k, the expressions we obtain next are not re-
duced form solutions for those taxes as they will depend on other endogenous variables.
However, as above, we will be able to obtain the signs and intuition about the economic
determinants involved.
The optimal labor tax is obtained as follows. Similarly to the optimality condition of
capital stock given in equation (22), we may obtain the optimality condition with respect
to the allocation of labor in the ith ﬁrm; which yields the following when evaluated in
steady state:10
[¡uh + ¸3uch(e r ¡ ±) ¡ ¸4uhh + ¸4uch e w]g(Ai)
+ ¸1Aifl(ki;li)g(Ai) + ¸2 [¿u(1 ¡ µ)Aifl(ki;li) + µAifl(ki;li) ¡ e w]g(Ai)
+ ¸5(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)Aifl(k¤
i ;l¤
i)1[Ai = A¤] = 0; (25)
where, as before, 1[Ai = A¤] takes the value of one if the ﬁrm i is the marginal ﬁrm and
zero otherwise.
The social planner balances the social beneﬁt of increasing output through a marginal
increase in labor (the term involving ¸1), the social value of increasing tax revenues (the
term involving ¸2) and the social value of the change in the marginal ﬁrm’s proﬁts (the
term involving ¸5) with the marginal social costs of increasing labor that is given by the
direct effect in the utility of the consumer and the effects in the marginal rates of substi-
10Follows from dividing both sides of equation (54) in the appendix by ¯
t and dropping the time indexes
since we are in steady state.
14tution (ﬁrst term of (25)). Similar effects were present in the derivation of (22), with the
exception of the last one.
Integrating this expression over all the ﬁrms involved in production and using the ﬁrst
order conditions with respect to ct , ~ wt and ~ rt (equations (55) to (57) in the appendix) we
obtain:
¿l [¸2 (1 + ¾hh + ¾ch) + uc] = ¸2
·
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¿u)
SY
(SY ¡ 1) + (¾hh + ¾cc + ¾ch)
¸
(26)
where¾cc = ¡ucce c
uc , ¾ch =
uche c
uh , ¾hh =
¡uhh(1¡h)









0. The term in parenthesis that multiplies ¿l is positive, so the sign of this tax depends on
the sign of the right hand side of (26). The ﬁrst term on the right hand side has similar
components to the expression obtained for ¿k in (24, and is negative. The second term is
the sum of ¾cc;¾ch and ¾hh, which is related to the concavity of the utility function and is
positive.
Equation (26) shows that there are two forces involved in the determination of the
sign of the optimal labor tax rate. On the one hand, and similar to the case of ¿k, there
is an incentive to subsidize ﬁrms’ production costs (the ﬁrst part of the right hand side
on (26)) to induce ﬁrms into production, which allows the government to collect ﬁscal
revenue from these additional ﬁrms through the corporate tax. On the other hand, there
is a second term that considers the impact on the individual’s utility of distorting leisure
that shows that the more concave is the utility function, the more likely the optimal labor
tax to be positive.
Further, note that if the whole set of ﬁrms is involved in production ¸5 = 0 and, from
equation (23), ¸2 = 0. It follows from equation (26) that the optimal ¿l is zero, as in the
case of capital taxation. The intuition is that as the whole set of ﬁrms is already involved
11Also, note that
¯bss = (1 + e r ¡ ±)bss
is the gross return on bonds in steady state and
(1 ¡ ¯)bss =
e r ¡ ±





is the bonds’ interest payment expressed in units of this period.
15in production, the planner’s incentives to subsidize ﬁrms’ costs disappear. Fiscal revenue
will be obtained from ﬁrms’ proﬁts, as will be shown below. As a result, the optimal
policy is to set ¿l = 0 to avoid distortions in the marginal rates of substitution.
We next focus on obtaining the optimal tax on proﬁts, ¿u. We will initially analyze
the case in which there are ﬁrms involved in production while others obtain Á in the
alternative outside option. In this case A¤ is interior, i.e. Al < A¤ < Au and ¸5 > 0.
To obtain ¿u note that using equations (25) and the ﬁrst order condition with respect
to A¤ (equation (58) in the appendix) yields:
¿u











Again, this expression is not a closed form solution since it depends on other endoge-
nous variables. However, it is enough to determine the sign of ¿u, which is positive since
the right hand side of (27) is positive for the reasons mentioned above.
We analyze next the case in which A¤ is not interior, i.e. Al = A¤. In this case equation
(27) cannot be applied in the analysis since it was obtained using the ﬁrst order condition
with respect to A¤, equation (58) in the appendix, that is no longer valid in the case that
A¤ = Al. To obtain ¿u in this corner case note that we must satisfy the government budget




(1 ¡ µ)Aif(ki;li)dG(Ai) +
bss
1 + e r ¡ ±
¡ bss = g
where bss is the level of government bonds in steady state. It follows that:
¿u =





Note that in the case where all ﬁrms are involved in production, the sign of¿u depends
on ﬁscal expenditure, g, plus bond interest payments in steady state, (1 ¡ ¯)bss. We can




16Proposition 2. In the case that some ﬁrms are not involved in production, the optimal tax on
proﬁts is positive while the sign of the optimal labor tax remains ambiguous. However, in the case
that all ﬁrms are involved in production, the optimal tax on proﬁts is different from zero while the
labor tax is zero.
3.3 Allowing Taxation on the Yields of the Alternative Option.
We have analyzed a setup where the planner faces a problem in which (1) there are het-
erogeneous ﬁrms and (2) there is an alternative outside option available to ﬁrms whose
return is not taxable. In this setup, we have shown that ¿k · 0 and ¿u > 0 while the
sign of ¿l is ambiguous. We have also shown that in the case that all ﬁrms choose to be
involved in production, the optimal taxes are ¿k = ¿l = 0 and ¿u 6= 0 .
We will argue next that these results depend crucially on the absence of taxation of
the outside option at the same rate as proﬁts derived from production. To understand the
importance of this assumption, we will allow next for taxation of Á at the same rate that
is applied to proﬁts obtained in production, ¿u. In that case, our Ramsey problem would
be modiﬁed as follows:
L = max
fct;¿u

























































1 + ~ rt+1 ¡ ±




t [uc(t) ¡ ¯uc(t + 1)(1 + ~ rt+1 ¡ ±)] + ¹4
t [uh(t) ¡ uc(t) ~ wt] + ¹5
t(1 ¡ ¿u






Problem (29) differs from problem (21) in two ways. First, the government budget con-
straint includes the taxation of the yields from the outside option, ¿u
t ÁG(A¤
t), and second,
the marginal ﬁrm’s entry decision differs, as a ﬁrm obtains a return (1¡¿u
t )Á if it chooses
not to participate in production. We will next obtain the optimal taxes in this case. The
17next proposition states the results.
Proposition 3. If we allow taxation of the outside option at the rate ¿u, the optimal tax rates are
¿k = ¿l = 0 while ¿u 6= 0.
Proof. We focus initially on the case of an interior solution for A¤
t. The ﬁrst order










= ¹5 [(1 ¡ µ)A¤
tf(k¤
t;l¤
t) ¡ Á]: (30)
Since in an interior solution (1 ¡ µ)A¤
tf(k¤
t;l¤
t) = Á it follows that ¹2 = 0. Using this
condition, and the optimality condition with respect to capital stock, we obtain:
¿k = ¡





On the other hand, using the optimality condition with respect to A¤, the optimality
condition on labor and the result concerning ¹2, we get:
¿k =












Note that (31) implies ¿k · 0 while (32) implies ¿k ¸ 0. It follows that ¿k = 0. Further,
the optimality condition with respect to labor implies:
¿l (uc + ¹2(1 + ¾hh + ¾ch)) = ¹2
(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ¿u)
SY
[SY ¡ 1] + ¹2 [¾hh + ¾cc + ¾ch]:(33)
But since ¹2 = 0, it follows that (33) implies ¿l = 0. Finally, to satisfy the government
budget constraint we require:
¿u =





13We do not post in the appendix the derivations since they are similar to the ones obtained in the case
where Á is not taxable.
18where bss is the level of government bonds in steady state.
We will now establish the results in the case of no interior solution, i.e. A¤ = Al. In
this case ¹5 = 0 and by the optimality condition on ¿u, we have ¹2 = 0. Trivially by (32)
and (33), we obtain ¿k = ¿l = 0 and by (34), we get ¿u 6= 0. 2
Proposition 3 illustrates the importance of the impossibility of taxing ﬁrms’ outside
option at the same rate as proﬁts in our results: if we allow taxation of the proceeds of the
alternative activity at the same rate as proﬁts, capital income and labor taxes would be
zero. In this case the tax on proﬁts, ¿u, is non distortive since it does not affect either the
intensive or the extensive margins because in both sectors there is a common tax rate.14
We can relate this result to the ones obtained previously that highlight the relevance
of the extensive margins and the completeness of the tax system. The capital and labor in-
come tax rates are zero when all ﬁrms are involved in production and/or the yields of the
alternative option are taxable. That is, when there is no distortion in the extensive margin
derived from the tax on proﬁts. When there is such a distortion because the alternative
option cannot be taxed and some ﬁrms choose not to produce, the planner subsidizes cap-
ital and possibly labor to induce ﬁrms into production, making them taxable. In this way,
the planner completes, at least partially, the tax system.
4 Numerical Examples
We now use numerical methods to simulate calibrated versions of the model we have
analyzed. We will use these results to conﬁrm the validity of our analytical expressions
and shed additional light on our results. We use the following standard functional form




t (H ¡ lt)1¡©2¢©3
©3
(35)
The production function of a ﬁrm in operation:
14Note that if the tax on the alternative option, call it ¿
Á, were different from the tax on proﬁts a change in
this tax would affect the extensive margin. However, our analysis of non taxation of the alternative option








In our simulations, we consider the long-run steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium.
To obtain our results, we follow the procedure developed in Schmidt-Gohré and Uribe
(2006). In the notation that follows, we eliminate the time index since we analyze the
steady state. Let F(x;¡) be the ﬁrst order condition of the Ramsey problem deﬁned in
(21), where x are the variables and ¡ are the parameters of the problem. Optimality re-
quires F(x;¡) = 0. Our goal is to obtain xss -where ss indicates steady state- such that
F(xss;¡) = 0. To obtain the solution, we use the symbolic Matlab toolbox and implement
the following algorithm:
1. Guess an initial candidate vector x
j
ss and choose criteria ± > 0;À > 0, where j indi-
cates iteration.
2. Compute the direction sj to modify the initial candidate vector x
j
ss. The direction is





ss;¡) is the Jacobian of F(x;¡) evaluated at x
j
ss and 0 indicates trans-
pose.
3. Solve for the line-step criterion, ¸j, as in ¸j = argim¸ F(x
j
ss + ¸sj;¡).
4. Compute the update x
j+1









ss k < À(1 + kx
j
ssk) continue to next step, otherwise go back to step 2.
6. If krF(x
j+1
ss ;¡)k < ±(1 + kF(x
j+1
ss ;¡)k) stop and report success, otherwise report
failure.
15We alternatively used the Broyden-Fltecher-Goldfarb-Shannon method but we found no signiﬁcative
differences in our results.
20Calculation of the guess x
j
ss
To implement the numerical procedure, we require a candidate steady state vector in
the jth iteration, x
j
ss, which is calculated as follows. We discretize the number of ﬁrms and









of the variables evaluated in the steady state are obtained by using the following algo-
rithm in iteration j. Using the consumer’s intertemporal optimality condition evaluated





¡ (1 ¡ ±) (37)








where N is the discrete number of total ﬁrms in the economy. Further, note that each


























Note that equations (38) and (42) provide labor demand as a function of the labor
supply guess and productivity parameters:




































ss i = 1;:::;N (43)















We deﬁne next an indicator function equal to one when the ﬁrm decides to operate by
using:







² ) + ¼=2)
¼
(45)
where 1i(operation)j is the indicator function which is equal to one if the ith ﬁrm op-





i represent capital and labor demand if the ith ﬁrm operates. These de-
mands are deﬁned in (43) and (44). The parameter ² determines the shape of the function,
the smaller is ² the less smooth is the function. An example of this function is shown in
ﬁgure (1). It shows the case of a ﬁrm that faces (¿u = 0:1;Á = 1). In the ﬁgure we treat
capital and labor demand as exogenous. Obviously in our model, these two last variables
are endogenous. However, in the ﬁgure we treat them as exogenous to describe the way
the function works out. In the ﬁgure, Ai ¼ 1:1 is a threshold level: if the ﬁrm draws a pro-
ductivity parameter larger than the threshold level, the ﬁrm’s after-tax proﬁts are larger
than Á and the ﬁrm operates. Clearly, the smaller is ² the more the function resembles an
indicator function.
[Insert ﬁgure 1 about here]
Note that if a ﬁrm does not operate, it does not demand either labor or capital. There-







i;ss 1i(operation)j = 1









i;ss 1i(operation)j = 1
0 1i(operation)j = 0
)
(47)















where G is ﬁscal expenditure. Next note that marginal utilities of consumption and























tion and leisure, total labor supply is17:
lj










Equation (51) allows us to update our guess on labor supply. Let l
j;updated
ss be the up-




ss k < #, where # > 0 is a convergence criterion, we
have computed the candidate vector x
j
ss. Otherwise, we go back to (37) and recompute
the steady state variables in the jth iteration, using the updated labor supply.
Equations (37), (43) to (51) and the tax guesses allow us to obtain our candidate vector
x
j
ss in the jth iteration.
Parameters and results
We set the following parameters: ¯ = 0:9906, ± = 0:05, ® = 0:36, ©2 = 0:75, ©3 = 1,
17In this step, we require e w
j which is computed as:
e w




N (1 ¡ ¿
l;j
ss )
where N indicates the ﬁrm with the larger productivity parameter which by assumption (2) is always in-
volved in production.
23² = 10¡100. These parameters are consistent with the values reported Schmidt-Gohré and
Uribe (2006). We discretize productivity in 50 equidistant points in the range [1;5], each
of the points with 2% probability. Hence, our numerical exercises will have 50 different
types of ﬁrms.
Figures (2) to (4) show the results concerning after-tax proﬁts, labor demand and cap-
ital demand per type of ﬁrm for µ = f0:7;0:85;0:9g and Á = 1:5. In the ﬁgures, when
a ﬁrm’s after-tax proﬁt is equal to Á, the ﬁrm is not involved in production. As shown
in the ﬁgures, optimal tax rates differ. In line with our theoretical discussion, we obtain
in the three cases ¿u > 0;¿k and ¿l < 0. In general, the larger is µ the larger is ¿u and
the larger are the subsidies to the capital and labor income, ¿k and ¿l. Further, ﬁgure (2)
shows also that the larger is µ, the larger is the fraction of ﬁrms with after-tax proﬁts equal
to Á, i.e. the larger is the fraction of ﬁrms not involved in production. Figures (3) and (4)
show, respectively, labor and capital demand per ﬁrm. The larger is µ, the larger is the
increase in labor and capital demand as productivity rises, conditional on the ﬁrm being
in operation. These results hold because the larger is µ, the more elastic is the marginal
cost of the ﬁrm and therefore the larger is the output and factor demand responses to the
change in productivity.
[Insert ﬁgures (2) to (4) about here]
Table (1) shows the results for different values of Á. The ﬁrst three columns of the table
present the ﬁrm’s exogenous parameters, the next three columns show the preference
parameters and the last four columns show the results, including the fraction of ﬁrms
involved in production, 1 ¡ G(A¤). In the table, ﬁscal expenditure is set at a level of 500,
which corresponds to 7% of output when (Á = 0;g = 0), i.e. the case in which all ﬁrms
are involved in production and there are no ﬁscal distortions.
The table shows that, conditional on Á, a larger µ in most of the cases is associated with
a larger corporate tax rate and larger capital and labor subsidies. Similarly, the fraction of
ﬁrms involved in production decreases. These results are in line with the results obtained
in ﬁgures (2) to (4) but as shown in the table, they also apply to the cases of Á = f1;1:5;2g.
Intuitively, the larger is µ, holding constant other parameters, the lower are ﬁrms’ proﬁts
and the larger must be the corporate tax rate to raise revenues. On the other hand,the
larger is µ, larger subsidies to production costs are required to complete the tax system,
i.e. provide incentive to ﬁrms to produce. Finally, the result concerning a lower fraction
of ﬁrms involved in production is easily explained because a larger µ is associated with
24larger factor payments and lower after-tax ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
[Insert table (1) about here]
Table (2) provides sensitivity analysis. In the table we use the cases: (Á;µ) = (1;0:85)
and (Á;µ) = (1;0:9) as benchmark. We initially include in the table a larger ﬁscal expendi-
ture. We set ﬁscal expenditure at 600 which corresponds to approximately 8.5% of output
when all ﬁrms are involved in production and there are no ﬁscal distortions. While the
signs of the tax rates continue to be ¿u > 0;¿k;¿l < 0, there is not a unique response
of the tax rates to the increase in ﬁscal expenditure. On one hand, when µ = 0:85, the
magnitudes of both the subsidies and the corporate tax rate decrease and as a result, the
fraction of ﬁrms becomes larger. In that case, the base of collection, in terms of the number
of ﬁrms, increases. On the other hand, when µ = 0:9, the corporate tax rate marginally in-
creases while the labor tax rate becomes larger and the capital income tax rate approaches
zero. In this case, the fraction of ﬁrms involved in production remains stable while the
increase in labor subsidy is small compared to the decrease in capital income tax rate, i.e.
the increase in tax revenues is obtained holding constant the base of the tax collection and
decreasing net subsidies.
We next increase the capital share in the production function by setting ® = 0:4.
In this case, the optimal subsidy in capital income becomes larger, both in the case of
µ = f0:85;0:9g while the labor subsidy and the corporate tax rate approach zero. As a
result, the number of ﬁrms involved in production is larger. In this case, the ﬁrm’s capital
demand becomes more elastic providing more incentives to the planner to depress the
rate of return faced by ﬁrms to induce more ﬁrms into production. Since the number of
ﬁrms involved in production -which is a component of the tax base- rises, the planner
might depress the labor subsidy and the corporate tax rate.
Finally, we provide a sensitivity analysis of the response of optimal tax rates vis-µ a-
vis the parameters of the utility function, (©2;©3). On one hand, when we increase ©2,
the triplet of taxes approaches zero while the fraction of ﬁrms involved in production
increases. In this case, distortions in leisure are more relevant, and the planner reacts
by setting a smaller subsidy to labor income. To satisfy the government budget constraint
the planner reacts by providing incentives to new ﬁrms to enter into production by setting
lower distortions -through a lower corporate tax rate- in the extensive margin decision.
On the other hand, when we set ©3 = 0:75, i.e. the utility function becomes more concave,
we obtain mixed results. In the case of µ = 0:85, the capital income subsidy approaches
25zero while the magnitude of the labor income subsidy and the magnitude of the corporate
tax rate increase and subsequently the fraction of ﬁrms involved in production decreases.
When µ = 0:9, the converse holds. The consequence of this last set of results is that the
planner uses the optimal tax rates such that ﬂuctuations in the fraction of ﬁrms involved
inproductionisdiminished, asawayofdecreasingﬂuctuationsinconsumptionandlabor
supply (leisure).
[Insert table (2) about here]
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced heterogeneous ﬁrms to study optimal taxation. Firms
differ in their productivity and have to decide if they want to produce in each period after
comparing their expected proﬁts vis-µ a-vis an outside option that is not taxable, i.e. our
environment is one of incomplete taxation (Correia (1996)). To ﬁnance its expenditure
the government relies on capital income, labor and proﬁts taxation. The presence of het-
erogeneous ﬁrms implies two kinds of possible distortions from taxes. They may affect
the extensive margin decisions (i.e. whether to produce or not) and the intensive margin
decisions (i.e. optimal allocation given that they decide to produce).
We have shown that the results depend on whether all ﬁrms decide to produce or the
less productive ﬁrms decide not to produce. In the ﬁrst case, there is no distortion in the
extensive margin and the social planner will not tax capital, which replicates Chamley
(1986) and Judd (1985) results of not taxing capital income in the long run. Also, in this
case, it is optimal not to tax labor and leave the tax on proﬁts as the only source of ﬁscal
revenues.
However, when there are ﬁrms that are not so productive or when the outside option
is lucrative enough such that some ﬁrms prefer not to produce, it is optimal to subsidize
capital. The sign of the tax on labor income is ambiguous depending on the distortions it
creates in the labor supply.
The intuition of the subsidy is related to the government’s inability to tax the ﬁrms’
alternative option. By subsidizing production costs, the government induces ﬁrms to
produce, making it possible to tax their proﬁts. That is, in the second best, the planner is
partially completing the tax instruments by taxing ﬁrms that would not be taxed if they
remain in the alternative option. In this respect, ﬁrm heterogeneity is key to the results.
26We have also analyzed the case where the government can tax the yields from the
alternative option at the same rate it taxes proﬁts from ﬁrms that are involved in produc-
tion. In this case the tax system is complete and there is no need to induce ﬁrms into
production by subsidizing. Tax on proﬁts are now non distortive and it is optimal to set
tax on capital and labor income equal to zero.
27Appendix
²Derivation of equation 16











































































t ¸ gt 8t (52)
Finally, since wtlit + rtkit = µAitf(kit;lit), we get equation (16) in the text.
28²Optimality conditions of Ramsey problem in equation (21).
The optimality condition with respect to kit is:
¸1t¯t [Aitfk(kit;lit) + (1 ¡ ±)]g(Ait) + ¸2t¯t [¿u
t (1 ¡ µ)Aitfk(kit;lit) + µAitfk(kit;lit) ¡ e rt]g(Ait)
+ ¸5t¯t(1 ¡ ¿u




t] = ¯t¡1 (53)
The optimality condition with respect to lit is:
¯t [¡uh(t) + ¸3tuch(t)(e rt ¡ ±) ¡ ¸4tuhh(t) + ¸4tuch(t)e wt]g(Ait)
+ ¯t¸1tAitfl(kit;lit)g(Ait) + ¯t¸2t [¿u
t (1 ¡ µ)Aitfl(kit;lit) + µAitfl(kit;lit) ¡ e wt]g(Ait)
+ ¯t¸5t(1 ¡ ¿u




t] = 0 (54)
The optimality condition with respect to (ct;A¤
t;f wt;e rt) evaluated in steady state are:
[c] : uc(c;h) ¡ ¸1 + ucc(c;h)[¸3(¡e r + ±) ¡ ¸4 e w] = 0 (55)
[e w] : ¡¸2
Z Au
A¤
lidG(At) ¡ ¸4uc(c;h) = 0 (56)





1 + e r ¡ ±
¡ ¸3uc(c;h) = 0 (57)
[A¤] : [uh ¡ ¸3uch(e r ¡ ±) ¡ ¸4uch e w + ¸4uhh]l¤g(A¤) + ¸1 [¡1 + (1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)]A¤f(k¤;l¤)g(A¤) +
+¸1e rk¤g(A¤) + ¸2 [¡¿u(1 ¡ µ) ¡ µ]A¤f(k¤;l¤)g(A¤) + ¸2 [e rk¤ + e wl¤]g(A¤)
+¸5(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)f(k¤;l¤) = 0 (58)
29²Derivation of equation (24):
























Aifk(ki;li)dG(Ai) ¡ e r(1 ¡ G(A¤
t))
#
+ ¸5(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)A¤fk(k¤;l¤) = 0 (59)
Adding and substracting ¸2
R Au
A¤







































(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)A¤fk(k¤;l¤) = 0 (60)
Since ¯(1 + e rt ¡ ±) = 1 and using (5):




(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)r = 0(61)
Dividing by r:




(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ) = 0 (62)










[SY ¡ 1] (63)
30Where (63) is equation (24) in the text.
²Derivation of equation (26):
Integrating (25) with respect to the ﬁrms involved in production, we have:












Aifl(ki;li)dG(Ai) ¡ e w(1 ¡ G(A¤))
¸
+ ¸5(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)A¤fl(k¤;l¤) = 0 (64)
Adding and substracting ¸2
R Au
A¤
t Aifl(ki;li)g(Ai) and dividing by 1¡G(A¤), we obtain:





















(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)A¤fl(k¤;l¤) = 0 (65)
Using (6):
[uh ¡ ¸3uch(e r ¡ ±) + ¸4uhh ¡ ¸4uch e w]
= ¸1w + ¸2 [(¿u ¡ 1)(1 ¡ µ)w] + ¸2w¿l +
¸5
1 ¡ G(A¤)
(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)w (66)
31It follows that:
¿l =











(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ) (67)
Using (23) in (67):
¿l =










(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ) (68)
Note that using (55) to (58):
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Since uc e w = uh, we have:














1 + e r ¡ ±
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Further ¯(1 + e rt ¡ ±) = 1 implies b
1+e r¡± = b¯. Let ¾cc = ¡ucce c
uc , ¾ch =
uche c
uh , ¾(h) =
¡uhh(1¡h)








is total individual’s in-
come -excluding ﬁrm’s transfers- in steady state. It follows:







+ ¾cc + ¾ch(1 ¡ ¿l) + ¾hh(1 ¡ ¿l) (70)
Replacing (70) in (68):
¿l = ¡¿luc
¸2











+ ¾ch + ¾hh
¶





(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ) (71)
This is equation (26) in the text.
²Derivation of equation (27):
Replacing (66) in (58):
¸1wl¤g(A¤) + ¸2 [(¿u ¡ 1)(1 ¡ µ)wl¤g(A¤)] + ¸2w¿ll¤g(A¤) +
¸5
1 ¡ G(A¤)
(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)wl¤g(A¤)
+ ¸1 [¡1 + (1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)]A¤f(k¤;l¤)g(A¤) + ¸1e rk¤g(A¤)
+ ¸2 [¡¿u(1 ¡ µ) ¡ µ]A¤f(k¤;l¤)g(A¤) + ¸2 [e rk¤ + e wl¤]g(A¤) + ¸5(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)f(k¤;l¤) = 0 (72)
Using e r = r(1 ¡ ¿k) and additional steps of algebra:
(¸1 + ¸2)[wl¤ + rk¤]g(A¤) + ¸2 [(¿u ¡ 1)(1 ¡ µ)wl¤g(A¤)]
+ (¸1 + ¸2)[¡1 + (1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)]A¤f(k¤;l¤)g(A¤) ¡ (¸1 + ¸2)r¿kk¤g(A¤)
+ ¸5(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)f(k¤;l¤) +
¸5
1 ¡ G(A¤)
(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)wl¤g(A¤) = 0 (73)
33It follows:






[(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)wl¤g(A¤)]
+ (¸1 + ¸2)[¡1 + (1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)]A¤f(k¤;l¤)g(A¤) ¡
¸5
1 ¡ G(A¤)
(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)(SY ¡ 1)rk¤g(A¤)
+ ¸5(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)f(k¤;l¤) = 0
Since (23) implies ¸2 = ¸5
1¡G(A¤)SY , we have:
¡(¸1 + ¸2)¿u(1 ¡ µ)A¤f(k¤;l¤)g(A¤) +
¸5
1 ¡ G(A¤)




(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)A¤f(k¤;l¤) = 0
Dividing by (¸1 + ¸2)(1 ¡ ¿u)(1 ¡ µ)A¤f(k¤;l¤), we ﬁnally obtain:
¿u











which is (27) in the text.
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1 0.9 0.36 0.75 1 500 0.30 -0.3816 -1.0553 0.5319
1 0.85 0.36 0.75 1 600 0.46 -0.0109 -0.0514 0.0219
1 0.9 0.36 0.75 1 600 0.30 -0.2141 -1.1232 0.565
1 0.85 0.4 0.75 1 500 0.48 -0.4368 -0.1017 0.2317
1 0.9 0.4 0.75 1 500 0.36 -0.3923 -0.2923 0.3191
1 0.85 0.36 0.85 1 500 0.46 -0.2905 -0.0546 0.1434
1 0.9 0.36 0.85 1 500 0.34 -0.3349 -0.2621 0.2708
1 0.85 0.36 0.75 0.75 500 0.40 -0.1416 -2.5552 0.4611
1 0.9 0.36 0.75 0.75 500 0.34 -0.4456 -0.2417 0.2637







ki = 1:5;hi = 0:7;Á = 1;¿u = 0:1;® = 0:36;µ = 0:4
39Figure 2: Steady state after-tax proﬁts per ﬁrm
40Figure 3: Steady state labor demand per ﬁrm
41Figure 4: Steady state capital demand per ﬁrm
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